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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
N. M. LONG & COMPANY, a corpora-

tion, and MAGGIE J. SMITH,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
R. KAY MOWER and MRS. M. H.
MOWER,
Plaintiffs in Intervention
and Appellamts,
vs.

Case No.
8999

C A N N 0 N - PAPANIKOLAS C 0 N STRUCTION COMPANY, a partnership, EDWARD H 0 L ME S, and
GRANT JENSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action to recover damages which are alleged
to have resulted from Respondents' installation of drains in
their lands for the purpose of rendering the same suitable
for subdividing and building homes thereon, the Appellants
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claiming that the drains reduced the "static pressure" of the
water seeping through the ground, thereby decreasing the
amount of water of and flowing from a pond, to which
water Appellants claim the right to use.
Hereinafter, for convenience, Appellants will be referred to as plaintiffs and Respondents as defendants.
In addition to demanding judgment for damages, the
complaint of N. M. Long & Company and Maggie J. Smith
prays that defendants be enjoined from continuing the
operation of the drains (R. 5) . But, this relief was eliminated as an issue under the pretrial order (R. 24) and
properly so because if defendants were liable, plaintiffs'
remedy at law for damages, if any were sustained, would
have been adequate and, furthermore, the county which became vested with the ownership and control of the drains
through the dedication of the subdivision (R. 22, 248, Sec.
57-5-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953) and the persons who
had purchased and owned homes within the subdivisions at
the commencement of the action would be indispensable
parties to any suit which sought by a mandatory injunction
to destroy their properties by requiring defendants to discontinue the operation of said drains (R. 257, 304-305).
Hence, the facts found by the court, if sustained by any
substantial evidence in the record, are conclusive on this
appeal. In this respect, it should be noted that the trial
court, in addition to hearing the evidence and observing the
witnesses, pursuant to stipulation of counsel, visited the
area and examined the premises involved in this action (R.
308-309, 344).
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The land owned and subdivided by defendants (herein
sometimes referred to as the Subdivision) consists of approximately ninety-two acres (R. 50, Ex. 5, 6 & 7) lying
north of a street running east and west, known as Spring
Lane (about 5100 South, Salt Lake County, Utah) and
between Hyland Drive and 1300 East Street of said county.
The land owned by the plaintiffs, R. K. Mower and Mrs.
Mower (herein sometimes referred to as the Mower Property) consists of approximately seven acres (R. 100-101)
and is located south of said Spring Lane and southeasterly
from the southeast corner of the Subdivision. The land
owned by the plaintiff, Maggie J. Smith, approximately six
acres (R. 282) (herein sometimes referred to as the Smith
Property) lies north of said lane and some distance west
of the Subdivision. The land owned by the plaintiff, N. M.
Long Company (herein sometimes referred to as the Long
Property) consists of approximately nineteen acres (R. 227)
and likewise lies north of said lane and west of the Smith
Property, being at the northeast corner of Spring Lane and
1300 East Street (Ex. 12 and 35).
A pond is located on the Mower Property, herein and
in the evidence referred to as the "Mower Pond", (R. 70,
Ex. 8) . The Mower Pond is supplied and sustained by
water which escapes through seepage from Cottonwood
Creek and the seepage water resulting from the irrigation
of lands of a higher elevation and lying to the east of the
Mower Pond (R. 51, 108).
The Mower Pond was created by digging, excavating
and draining in the sloughs on or near the Mower Property
(R. 51, 117-118). It is apparent that the excavations on
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the Mower Property not only created the pond, but served
to drain the remaining Mower premises. in order to render
the·m suitable for the construction of the dwelling and
other improvements now located on said premises (R. 117118). At the west end of the Mower Pond is a headgate
which controls the flow of water from the pond into a ditch,
herein and in the evidence referred to as the "Long Ditch"
(R. 173, Ex. 12, 34). This ditch runs some distance west
along the south side of Spring Lane, then crosses said lane
and runs westerly to the Smith and Long Properties (R.
102, 173, Ex. 8, 12).
For illustration and as a convenient reference for the
court, there is contained in an appendix hereto a map showing the location of the properties involved herein, the Mower
Pond, the Long Ditch and Spring Run.
Defendants purchased the lands embraced within the
Subdivision for the purpose of subdividing the same and
constructing residential dwellings thereon (R. 52, 254).
When acquired by defendants, said' lands were swampy and
mostly wet pasture (R. 52, 7, 246, 305). In order to render
their lands suitable for subdividing and building thereon,
defendants, under the supervision of a licensed engineer,
installed drains in said lands ( R. 53, 215) . In this connection, the trial court found :
"Said drains were installed by said defendants,
not to claim or destroy or decrease or interfere with
plaintiffs' or intervening plaintiffs' water rights,
but for the purpose of improving said defendants'
own lands by increasing their value and making them
productive, which otherwise would remain of little
or no value as merely a slough" (R. 53).
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The bottom of the Mower Pond is approximately 11 feet
higher in elevation than the ground level of the Subdivision
(R. 51, 105, Ex. 9). The nearest drain to the Mower Pond
lies some 350 feet northwesterly from the pond (R. 51, 106).
The drains collect and return to a creek lying northwesterly
of the Subdivision the same water which prior to the installation of the drains had flowed or drained from the
subdivision lands into said creek (R. 51, 109-110, 250, 256).
This creek is known as "Spring Run" and also as "Spring
Creek", but will be referred to herein only as Spring Run
so as not to confuse it with a "Spring Creek", not involved
in this case (R. 331-332). All the water deposited by the
drains into Spring Run had been appropriated by persons
who are not parties to this action and defendants could not
lawfully have diverted the same (R. 204-205, Ex. 24-25).
The trial court found : "There has been a decrease in
the amount of the seepage waters that came to the surface
as springs and then flowed into the Long Ditch, or the other
ditch bringing water a short distance to the pond, but not
by any wrongful act of said defendants. There is no direct
evidence in the record that said drains in any way shut off
the waters from the plaintiffs, either in the Mower Pond
or ditch" (R. 53) .
It has been stipulated that defendants have never
claimed any rights to the use of any waters involved or referred to in this case, and there are no competitive claims
to such waters (R. 53, 258, 306, 308).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Defendants, by draining their lands to improve
and make a reasonable use thereof, are not liable to plaintiffs, even though as an incident to such drainage plaintiffs
were damaged by a decrease in the amount of seepage
waters to which they claimed a right of use.

2. The installation of the drains in defendants' subdivision was not the legal cause of plaintiffs' alleged damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO.1
DEFENDANTS, BY DRAINING THEIR LANDS
TO IMPROVE AND MAKE A REASONABLE
USE THEREOF, ARE NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS, EVEN THOUGH AS AN INCIDENT TO
SUCH DRAINAGE PLAINTIFFS WERE DAMAGED BY A DECREASE IN THE AMOUNT
OF SEEPAGE WATERS TO WHICH THEY
CLAIMED A RIGHT OF USE.
At the outset, it is important to point out that this
case does not present a controversy involving the competitive use of water. In cases such as the instant case, it is the
settled law of this state, under the common law, and as
adopted by the Restatement, that a land owner is not liable
for interference with subterranean waters to which another
has the right of use, if such interference results as an incident to the land owner's reasonable use of his own land
and without negligence or malice on his part. Roberts vs.
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Gribble, 43 U. 411, 134 P. 1014; Peterson vs. Cache County
Drainage District, 77 U. 256, 294 P. 289; 29 A. L. R. 2d
1356; 109 A. L. R. 395; 55 A. L. R. 1386; Restatement of
the Law of Torts, Sec. 849.
In an early decision by this court, Roberts vs. Gribble,
(supra), it was held that a land owner had a right to drain
seepage and percolating waters from his land which rendered it swampy and marshy and unfit for cultivation, even
though in so doing the land owner interfered with another's
right to the use of underground waters.
The opinion states :
"We think the evidence both for appellants and
respondent tends to show that the waters in dispute
are seepage and percolating waters. These waters
rose in such quantities on respondent's land that it
became submerged and was rendered unfit for the
raising of hay and other farm products. The respondent undoubtedly had a right to drain his land of
the water and put it in a condition for raising crops.
Whether he did this by sinking wells or by digging
drain ditches was of no concern to appellants."
In the Drainage District case, the District had constructed drainage canals for the purpose of draining the
lands within the district, one of which canals was constructed near plaintiff's land. As a result of the construction of the drains, the water table within plaintiff's land
was lowered so that he could not subirrigate his land and
produce crops thereon as he previously had done. The court
held that the District was not liable to the plaintiff because
the proprietors of the lands within the District had a right
to improve their lands by draining them and if done so
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without malice or negligence, they were not liable for the
consequent lowering of the water table within plaintiff's
land.
The Restatement (Torts, Sec. 849) in setting forth the
rules governing liability in such cases, points out an important distinction between the rules applicable to controversies involving a competitive use of water and those
applicable to the instant case:
"b. Conduct no·t involving a competing use of
water. The distinction between conduct which constitutes a 'use of water' and conduct which does not
involve its utilization but merely affects its quality
or quantity is explained in Sec. 847, Comment a.
Interferences with one person's use of water by another's use of water involve a conflict over the same
physical substance, and raise problems of proprietary competition over that substance. These interferences are dealt with in Sees. 850-864. Interferences with a person's use of water by another's use
of land or other activity which affects water only
incidentally, do not directly raise problems of proprietary competition over the water itself, and therefore, in substance, involve the same questions as
other types of interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Consequently, the rules stated in Sees.
822-840, governing invasions of interests in the use
and enjoyment of land, are equally applicable to
such interferences \Vith a use of water."

For illustration of the rule applicable to cases not involving a competing use of water, the Restatement, Torts,
at page 338, cites the following:
"5. The A Mining Co. buys land and starts to
mine for coal therein. In the process of excavation,
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the flow of subterranean water is interfered with,
and a spring on near-by land in the possession of
B dries up as a result. A's operations do not involve
a use of subterranean water, and its liability to B
is governed by the rules stated in Sees. 822-840."
Under such circumstances, the land owner's liability
depends on whether his conduct is "(i) intentional and unreasonable; or (ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable
under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless
or ultrahazardous conduct." Restatement, Torts, Sec. 822.
The rationale of the rule herein dealt with is rather
well stated in the early case of Wheatley vs. Baugh, (1855)
25 Pa. 528, 64 Am. Dec. 721, 13 Mor. Min. Rep. 374 (cited
in 55 A. L. R. at page 1426) wherein the court says:
"But percolations (of water) spread in every
direction through the earth, and it is impossible to
avoid disturbing them without relinquishing the
necessary enjoyment of the land. Accordingly the
law has never gone so far as to recognize in one man
a right to convert another's farm to his own use for
the purposes of a filter. Such a claim, if sustained,
would amount to a total abrogation of the right of
property. No man could dig a cellar, or a well, or
build a house on his own land, because these operations necessarily interrupt the filtrations through
the earth. Nor could he cut down the forest and clear
his land for the purposes of husbandry, because the
evaporation which would be caused by exposing the
soil to the sun and air would inevitably diminish, to
some extent, the supply of water which would' otherwise filter through it. He could not even turn a
furrow for agricultural purposes, because this would,
partially, produce the same result."
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The first cases dealing with the rule applicable to controversies not involving a competitive use of water arose
in England and held that the land owner was absolutely
absolved from liability, at least in the absence of negligence
or malice. Apparently, this is the majority rule in the
United States. 29 A. L. R. 2d 1358. However, many cases
in this country follow a so-called American rule which
qualifies the English rule by holding that the land owner's
immunity from liability depends on whether his conduct
causing an interference with subterranean waters is reasonably necessary in connection with the use and improvement of his land. The latter rule has been referred to by
the text writers and some courts as the "doctrine of correlative rights" or the "doctrine of reasonwble use". In 29 A.
L. R. 2d at page 1364, the so-called American rule is stated
as follows:
"Under the rule or doctrine of correlative rights,
as applied in most jurisdictions, the owner or occupant of the containing land is not precluded from
utilizing it for any lawful and proper purpose to
which it is adapted, without liability for incidental
interference with the waters, and is required only
to so exercise his proprietary rights as not unreasonably or unnecessarily to obstruct or divert such
waters to the injury of neighboring proprietors. To
state the propositiou more concisely, immunity depends up-on whether the inte1·terence was reasoruLb~y
necessa.J'y in connection 1cith the use or improvement
of th(' la.nd." (Emphasis added.)
To characterize the American rule as the "doctrine of
correlative rights" or "doctrine of reasonable use", though
perhaps not inapt, is unfortunate as the same terminology is
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utilized by the courts with reference to the rules applicable
to cases involving competitive claims to underground water.
Hence, in considering the authorities applicable to the present case, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction, as
pointed out by the Restatement, between the rules applicable to the instant case, and those governing cases involving the competitive use of water. The judicial decisions,
on their facts and holdings, clearly recognize the distinction
irrespective of the language employed in the opinions. The
Supreme Court of Florida took occasion in the case of
Labruzzo vs. Atlantic Dredging & Construction Co., (1951
Florida) 54 So. 2d 673, 29 A. L. R. 2d 1346, to point out
that the so-called doctrine of correlative rights or reasonable use pertaining to cases involving competitive claims to
underground water is not applicable to cases concerning the
interference with water by another's use of land. The court
states in this respect :
"In the instant case, however, we are concerned
with an interference with plaintiffs' use of the
spring on their land, caused by conduct of the defendant not involving a competing use of water and
in which the effect on the subterranean water is only
incidental to the defendant's use of its land. Obviously, then, the rule of 'reasonable use', as engrafted upon the old common-law rule of absolute
and unqualified ownership of percolating waters,
insofar as the proprietary beneficial use of the ~vater
is concerned, has no application here where we are
concerned with the proprietary use of land, and
in which the water is only incidentally affected."
So far as our research has disclosed, all courts follow
either the so-called English rule or the American rule, with
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the lone exception of California. Whether this court follows
the English rule or the American rule, in either case the
defendants are not liable under the facts established in this
case: It is stipulated that the controversy herein does not
involve a competing use of water. It is established by the
evidence and findings of fact and conceded by the pleadings,
that the installation of the drains was reasonably necessary
in connection with the use and improvement of defendants'
lands. It is not claimed that the defendants, in draining
their lands to render them suitable for building homes
thereon, acted negligently, with malice or intent to do harm
to plaintiffs, defendants' sole intent and purpose being to
improve and make a reasonaJble use of their own lands. As
found by the court: "Said drains were installed by said
defendants, not to claim or destroy or decrease or interfere
with plaintiffs' or intervening plaintiffs' water rights, but
for the purpose of improving said defendants' own lands
by increasing their value and making them productive, which
otherwise would remain of little or no value as merely a
slough."
Under their point that "plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief", plaintiffs cite a recent decision of this
court, Kano vs. Arcon Cm·poration, (June 10, 1958) 7 U.
2d 431, 326 P. 2d 719. While the question of plaintiffs'
right to injunctive relief is not pertinent on this appeal,
we desire to point out that the issues considered in the Kano
case are clearly distinguishable from those presented in
the present case : The Kano case, unlike the instant case,
involved an intentional and unreasonable invasion of property rights, and the diversion of waters of a natural surface
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stream to which plaintiffs had acqured a right of use, as a
consequence of which plaintiffs were required to provide
other facilities, including pumping equipment, to retake
their water and, because of the time required to do so, plaintiffs lost their celery crop which they were about to plant.
To provide adequate relief for such an intentional and unreasonable invasion of plaintiffs.' rights, the plaintiffs. were
awarded damages for loss of their crop and defendants were
required to deposit the water at the boundary of plaintiffs'
land so that they could enjoy a gravity flow.
The facts in the instant case are different from the
Kano case in every material respect: Plaintiffs' impounding
and diversion facilities were not interfered with by defendants. The waters collected and deposited by the drains
into Spring Run are the same waters that formerly had
drained into said creek from the lands within the Subdivision. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants had any right to
the use of the waters of said creek It is plaintiffs' sole contention in this action that defendants (and for that matter
anyone else in the neighborhood) must perpetually leave
their property in a swampy condition so as not to disturb
the "static pressure" necessary to sustain the waters of a
pond previously created in connection with the drainage of
the Mower premises. And to that end, plaintiffs now claim
they are entitled to a mandatory injunction to restore· the
Subdivision to a slough.

POINT NO.2
THE INSTALLATION OF THE DRAINS IN DEFENDANTS' SUBDIVISION WAS NOT THE
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LEGAL CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGED
DAMAGES.
The trial court in its memorandum decision (R. 32, 33)
and findings of fact (R. 53), found that: "There has been
a decrease in the amount of the seepage waters that came
to the surface as springs and then flowed into the Long
Ditch, or the other ditch bringing water a short distance
to the pond, but not by any wrongful act of said defendants.
There is no direct evidence in the record that said drains
in any way shut off the waters from the plaintffs, either
in the Mower Pond or ditch."
Since as an element in establishing defendants' liability,
plaintiffs had the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that defendants' installation of the drains was
a proximate cause of the alleged interference with said subterranean seepage waters, the above findings are tantamount to a finding of fact that the decrease in the amount
of said waters was not attributable to defendant's conduct.
Plaintiffs' failure to prove such element necessary to defendants' liability, in and of itself, sustains the trial court's
judgment. Restatement, Torts, Sec. 822.
The record indicates a number of factors which reasonably could account for the decrease in the amount of said
seepage waters : The waters sustaining the Mower Pond
have their source in seepage from Big Cottonwood~ Creek
and irrigated lands lying at a higher elevation to the east
of said pond. Such seepage water is perched over a tight
layer of non-pervious material (R. 57, 106). A large sewer
system had been constructed throughout the area coincident
with the installation of the drains. The sewer lines lying
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east and at a higher elevation than the Mower property were
laid upon a gravel base which operated as drains and diverted part of said seepage waters before reaching the pond.
Said sewer lines also collected within the pipes a subsantial
amount of water which formerly formed a part of the seepage waters (R. 258, 259, 260-262, 267-268, 333-344). It is
common knowledge that farm acreage lying east of the pond
which formerly had supplied part of the seepage water from
the irrigation of said lands, has in recent years been utilized
increasingly for building homes. Weather conditions could
have been a factor in the diminished amount of seepage.
And, as indicated by the trial judge (who visited the premises) in his memorandum decision, the failure to service the
ditches and drains which collected and deposited the seepage
water in the pond, in and of itself, could account for the
diminished amount of water flowing into the pond (R. 33).
Hence, the trial court properly concluded that plaintiffs had not sustained their burden of proving that the
drains interfered with the waters in question. To have
found otherwise would have been pure speculation.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the trial court's findings
of fact are sustained by substantial evidence and the judgment is in accordance with the law.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, RAWLINS,
JONES & HENDERSON,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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